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Originally published in 1859, Mill's essay On Liberty is devoted to
the defense of
one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the
dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion
and control .... That principle is that the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant.'
Over a hundred years of controversy have surrounded this principle,
for there are difficulties in interpreting it, in reconciling it with Mill's
general utilitarian position, and in defending it under any particular
interpretation. These problems are given an increased urgency by the
recent surge of interest in, and heated controversy over, specific in-
stances of the legal enforcement of morality. Although it would be
folly to believe that Mill might provide us with the final word on all
the moral questions raised by such issues, one would hope that he
would at least provide us with a place to begin.
In this article, I shall seek to clarify Mill's principle primarily
through a discussion of the position which Lord Patrick Devlin has
taken on the enforcement of morality, with particular attention to
the critical reaction which Devlin has provoked from H.L.A. Hart
and Ronald Dworkin. An examination of the exchange amongst them
will reveal that what is by far the most significant source of contro-
versy over the enforcement of morality has come to be progressively
concealed from view.
Although I shall focus on the enforcement of sexual morality by
the criminal law, the issues are much broader than this. First, it is
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clear that the law is concerned with much more than sexual morality,
and that it is not only the criminal law which manifests such a con-
cern. Second, it is obvious that many, although not all, of the issues
which emerge arise in contexts other than the legal, such as the ques-
tion of what role a system of public education ought to play with
respect to the inculcation of moral and political principles.
One further caveat is in order before turning to Lord Devlin. We
are concerned here with the question of what critical principles, if
any, ought to limit a society's right to enforce its positive morality
through the vehicle of the criminal law regardless of the costs or con-
stitutional consequences of so doing. All of the parties to the dispute,
in other words, recognize that there might be constitutional barriers
to the legal enforcement of a particular moral prohibition, or that the
costs of enforcement in any given case might outweigh the benefits. "
I
In recommending that private homosexual acts between consenting
adults no longer be made criminal, and in endorsing the existing law
under which acts of prostitution were not in themselves punishable,
the 1957 Report of the Wolfenden Committee in England asserted
that unless crime is to be equated with sin, the law should not attempt
to regulate all private morality.3 Two years later, Lord (then Justice)
Devlin delivered his now famous Maccabaean lecture in jurisprudence,
"The Enforcement of Morals." 4 In this lecture, and in a variety of
other publications,5 he has taken strong exception to the Millian
stand taken in the Wolfenden report, and countered with his own
view that society has a prima facie right-perhaps even a duty-to en-
force its positive morality through the vehicle of the criminal law.
As both Hart and Dworkin have noted, there are two independent
arguments which may be identified in Devlin's writings.0 Briefly, they
are: (1) A shared morality is as necessary to a given society's con-
tinued existence as is a stable government; society thus has just as
2. For a good treatment of this issue, see Kadish, The Crisis of Overcrinsinalization,
374 ANNALS 157 (1967).
3. REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENWES AND PROSTITUTION 62 (Stern
& Day ed. 1963) (Wolfenden Report).
4. Reprinted as Morals in the Criminal Law, in P. DEVLIN, THE ENFOPCEMENT OV
MORALS (1965).
5. A number of Devlin's essays are reprinted in DEVLIN, id.
6. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); R. Dworkin, Lord Devlin and
the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966); Hart, Social Solidarity and the En.
forcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1967).
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much of a right to penalize deviations from its common morality as
it does to prohibit treason-in either instance it is simply asserting its
right to prevent its own social disintegration. (2) The bare fact that
a great majority of the members of any given community believe that
a certain kind of act is immoral is in itself a reason for a member of
that majority to view its legal prohibition as prima facie right (or
obligatory). The first argument, which Hart calls the "disintegration
thesis," rests on certain empirical assumptions about the effects on a
society of a failure to enforce its positive morality through the crim-
inal law. The second argument does not rest upon a consideration of
the consequences to society of the enforcement of morality, but rather
asserts a direct moral right on the part of society to "follow its own
lights," as Dworkin puts it. I would like to consider certain features
of these arguments, and the replies which have been made to them
by Hart and Dworkin respectively, in turn.
The first argument-the disintegration thesis-need not detain us
long. Surely Lord Devlin is correct in maintaining that there is at least
some sense in which "society may use the law to .. .safeguard any-
thing... that is essential to its existence." 7 But as Hart has convinc-
ingly argued on a number of separate occasions,8 the empirical assump-
tion that it must legislate sexual morality in order to avoid disinte-
gration is simply without foundation. Although there may be what
Hart has called a "natural necessity" for society to provide some mini-
mal protection for persons, property, and promises in order to con-
tinue in existence,9 there is no evidence whatsoever that there is any
similar need to prohibit homosexuality, prostitution, etc.
It is Devlin's second argument, asserting the right of society to
follow its own moral lights, which to my mind is of the greatest in-
terest. As Dworkin notes, one has to some degree to read between
the lines to find it in Devlin,10 and it is not clear that Devlin himself
would view it as separable from the disintegration argument. Indeed,
Dworkin's own description of the argument does not square very well
with the understanding which he seems to have of it when he is con-
cerned with criticizing it. As described by Dworkin the thesis is that
society has a right to prohibit those acts the performance of which
would bring about significant changes in those social institutions
7. DEvLiN, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added).
8. In addition to the works cited in note 6 supra, see Hart, Iminorality and Treason,
62 THE LisTrEr 162 (1959).
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. Lx (1961).
10. R. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 992.
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upon which the society's positive morality places a high value. Under-
stood in this way, the argument "does not claim that immorality is
sufficient to make conduct criminal."'1 But as analyzed by Dworkin,
the argument seems to be that the principled belief that a certain kind
of conduct is immoral is a sufficient ground, other things being equal,
for seeking to have it made illegal. If I can convince you that my be-
lief that homosexuality is immoral is based upon moral principle,
rather than mere prejudice, emotional reaction, or mistaken concep-
tion of fact, writes Dworkin, "[y]ou will admit that so long as I hold
my moral position, I have a moral right to vote against the homo-
sexual, because I have a right (indeed a duty) to vote my own con-
victions."12
Now although I may not be fully fair in representing the views of
either Dworkin or Lord Devlin as to what Devlin's argument really
is, it seems to me that some such principle is the ground upon which
most proponents of the legal enforcement of certain moral prohibi-
tions would rest their case. If one sincerely believes that the perform-
ance of a certain kind of act is wrong, what better reason could he
have for seeking (through the vehicle of the criminal law, if that is
necessary, and the costs aren't excessive) to prevent it? Indeed, even
Mill wrote that "We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to
imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for
doing it-if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not
by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience."13
Recent discussions of the enforcement of morality, taking place in
a climate where the virtues of religious and to some degree moral
tolerance are at least paid lip service, have generally concealed the
real roots of controversy by typically concentrating upon what are
at best only secondary considerations. Writers such as Lord Devlin
and Norman St. John-Stevas,' 4 writing under the heavy and frankly
acknowledged influence of a religious morality, sincerely believe that
certain kinds of behavior are immoral or sinful which others, par-
ticularly those with a utilitarian perspective, find either unobjection-
able or at worst pathetic. No wonder they differ as to what ought to
be prohibited by the criminal law. Their real differences are on the
moral merits; talk of the disintegration of society, tolerance, the costs
11. Id. at 993.
12. Id. at 995.
13. J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 60 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1957).
14. See NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEvAS, LIFE, DEATH AND TilE LAW (1961).
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of enforcement, and so on, represents secondary considerations which,
although sometimes quite relevant, are only secondary.*6
Ronald Dworkin's attack on Devlin is quite different from Hart's
attack on the disintegration thesis, for Dworkin is quite clear that
his difference with Devlin is on the moral merits. "What is shocking
and wrong," writes Dworkin, "is not his [Devlin's] idea that the com-
munity's morality counts, but his idea of what counts as the com-
munity's morality."'6 As this passage indicates, although Dworkin
casts the dispute between Lord Devlin and himself in terms of the
moral merits, the difference is framed in terms of what counts as the
positive morality of a community, not in terms of a difference in per-
sonal views of what qualifies as an acceptable set of principles of
critical morality. Although there is little doubt that Dworkin's vie,
of substantive harm or immorality is different from that of Devlin,
it is not his strategy to appeal to it. Rather, agreeing with Lord Devlin
that a man has not only the right but the duty to vote his moral con-
victions, Dworkin attempts to argue that most opposition to homo-
sexuality, pornography, and so on, cannot be defended as a matter
of principled moral conviction. It is only those moral convictions
which can be defended in terms of consistent reasons and principles
which one is entitled to impose upon others, Dworkin argues, and
this principle of entitlement is itself relevant because it is part of the
positive morality of the community of which both he and Lord Devlin
are members.
Even if it is true that most men think homosexuality an abom-
inable vice and cannot tolerate its presence, it remains possible
that this common opinion is a compound of prejudice (resting
on the assumption that homosexuals are morally inferior crea-
tures because they are effeminate), rationalization (based on as-
sumptions of fact so unsupported that they challenge the com-
munity's own standards of rationality), and personal aversion
(representing no conviction but merely blind hate rising from
unacknowledged self-suspicion). It remains possible that the ordi-
nary man could produce no reason for his view, but would simply
parrot his neighbor who in turn parrots him, or that he would
produce a reason which presupposes a general moral position he
could not sincerely or consistently claim to hold. If so, the prin-
ciples of democracy we follow do not call for the enforcement of
15. This has been noted before. See Louch, Sins and Crimes, 43 PniLosority 8, 47-48(1968).
16. R. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 1001.
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the consensus, for the belief that prejudices, personal aversions
and rationalizations do not justify restricting another's freedom
itself occupies a critical and fundamental position in our popular
morality. Nor would the bulk of the community then be entitled
to follow its own lights, for the community does not extend that
privilege to one who acts on the basis of prejudice, rationalization,
or personal aversion. Indeed, the distinction between these and
moral convictions, in the discriminatory sense, exists largely to
mark off the former as the sort of positions one is not entitled to
pursue.17
Dworkin's argument is a significant and novel attempt to defend a
libertarian position in terms which the legal moralist is himself con-
strained to accept, and he does this without taking joinder directly
on the issue of the substantive moral merits of homosexuality, prosti-
tution, or other practices. I agree with Dworkin that the principle of
political morality to which he calls our attention would be widely
accepted by reflective citizens and legislators in our community, and
I also believe that there are at least some instances in which an appeal
to it would be sufficient to defend a libertarian position. I, for one,
find his brief "Postscript on Pornography" quite convincing. But the
view has its difficulties.
First, it is not clear how Dworkin's principle of entitlement is to
be interpreted. Two interpretations suggest themselves, neither of
which would seem to yield the desired result. Perhaps all that is de-
manded is that there exist some reasoned principle in support of a
widespread belief that a certain kind of conduct is wrong; it need
not matter whether most people would appeal to that principle to
support their beliefs, all that need be required is that the principle
in question be consistent with whatever other moral principles are
attributed to them. But this interpretation is surely too weak; unless
one wishes to dismiss belief in God and an afterlife as irrational as
such, which Dworkin surely does not, it will not be difficult to con-
coct religious arguments to support the position of the legal moralist.
Now many of the arguments of the legal moralist will fail to impress
a substantial number of us, and we might even be inclined to label
them irrational; but they are not of the sort to be disqualified by
Dworkin's notions of arbitrariness, prejudice, irrationally mistaken
conceptions of fact, rationalization, pure emotive reaction, and so on.
17. Id. at 1000-01.
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The second possible interpretation would demand not only that there
exist a principled basis for the conviction that a certain kind of con-
duct is wrong, but that the majority of those who believe it to be
wrong do so because they in fact consciously hold to the principle
in question. But this interpretation is clearly too strong. As Dean
Rostow has convincingly argued,18 the moral convictions of most men
are at best only partly based on explicit principles; for the most part
they represent the uncritically accepted results of processes of ac-
culturation little understood by those who hold them. Were Dworkin's
principle to demand that it be anything more than this, it would, I
suspect, completely deny the community's positive morality any real
role at all.
Indeed, when pushed for an interpretation of the notion of a rea-
soned or principled basis for a moral conviction which would at least
be sufficient to exclude such things as pure "gut reaction" and ra-
tionalization, it seems that it is difficult to go far beyond the views
of Lord Devlin himself. For although Devlin has been taken to task
by Hart, Dworkin and others for taking the widespread existence of
feelings of "reprobation" and "disgust" toward certain kinds of be-
havior as sufficient warrant for prohibiting it, his view is in fact more
complicated, and more plausible, than this. Such feelings are at best
merely necessary, and not sufficient, for Devlin,1 9 presumably because
they are only evidence of the depth of conviction that a certain kind
of conduct is wrong. And they must be present after calm discussion
and deliberation on the issue of immorality, since such deliberation
has to yield a judgment of unanimity among "reasonable" men.20
Suffice it to say that I see no reason to believe that the libertarian
will receive much solace from the contention that it is only a com-
munity's principled moral convictions that it is entitled to enforce
through the criminal law on any plausible interpretation of "prin-
cipled" that would entitle it to enforce anything.
There is a second difficulty having to do with the status of Dwor-
kin's principle of entitlement. It is relevant, he claims, because it is
a recognized element of our shared positive political morality. But
suppose a community failed to recognize such a restrictive principle,
and rather put a premium upon individuals acting on their own lights
18. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 C.,.tsRiDCE L.J. 174, 197, reprinted in
Rosrow. THE SOVEREIGN PREROCATiVE 45, 78 (1962).
19. DEVLI, sup~ra note 4, at 17.
20. Id. at 17-22.
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as determined by their spontaneous reactions of the moment? Would
such a society on Dworkin's view be entitled-indeed, even have a
duty-to enforce its shared morality whenever a consensus existed,
regardless of how arbitrary or unreasonable their convictions might
be? Here again Dworkin's concession to the legal moralist must be
simply too great for the libertarian to tolerate.
It would appear, then, that the libertarian has no resort but to
appeal to his own substantive views of what is right and wrong, and
seek to convince his opponent either that certain kinds of conduct
are really not immoral, or else that they are not harmful enough to
warrant the high costs of making them illegal. The remaining ques-
tion, then, is whether or not there are any critical principles to which
he might appeal which would delimit some sphere of human conduct
as absolutely outside of the legitimate range of coercive social con-
trol. In short, can Mill's principle, or something like it, be given a
reasonable defense?
II
One looks here, not to Hart's criticism of Devlin's dubious disin-
tegration thesis, but to his discussion of Mill's principle in Law, Lib-
erty, and Morality. What one finds is, I am afraid, quite disappointing.
Hart writes that Mill's protests against paternalism were excessive,
and argues that his principle must be modified so as to permit inter-
ference with individual liberty on frankly paternalistic grounds.21
Legal interference, he concedes, may be warranted either to protect
others from harm, or to prevent the agent from harming himself.
However, Hart claims that such modified principles would not be
inconsistent with opposition to the use of the criminal law for the
enforcement of morality.22
It is here that Lord Devlin has had a field day with Hart's views.23
If it is right to protect an individual from inflicting a physical harm
upon himself, or to prevent him from consenting to the infliction of
such a harm, how can it be wrong to prevent him from inflicting
moral harm upon himself? Does Hart mean to distinguish physical
from moral paternalism? Or is there a distinction to be made between
moral paternalism and the enforcement of morality? Lord Devlin is
21. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MfORALITY, supra note 6, at 32.
22. Id. at 33.
23. Devlin, Morals and Contemporary Social Reality, in DEVLIN, supra note 4, at 124,
132-39.
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at his best in pointing out the obvious reasons why Hart is in no posi-
tion to give affirmative answers to the latter two questions, and his
discussion makes it quite clear that, as suggested earlier, he believes
that society has a right to prevent harms and immorality, whether
physical or not, just because they are wrongs. Once one amends Mill's
principle in the manner suggested by Hart, the only grounds upon
which a controversy over a specific prohibition may be fought out are
in terms of the nature and -magmitude of the putative harm. Given
the fact that Hart does not challenge the view that homosexuality is
immoral, only upon arbitrary grounds could he protest against making
it illegal while countenancing the enforcement of laws designed to
protect people from harming themselves physically. Specific qualms
about difficulty of enforcement he could appeal to; the great value
of the freedom being encroached upon is open to him to emphasize;
but he cannot appeal to a principled basis for rejecting it as a species
of legal moralism. Hart is most effective in criticizing overdrawn and
often silly arguments presented by the legal moralist. But we have
seen that these arguments are only of secondary concern, the primary
argument being one which he never confronts, yet must face in view
of his modification of Mill's principle. What one suspects is that, if
pushed, Hart would in fact retreat to a utilitarian position and chal-
lenge the view that homosexuality is immoral. But as Devlin suggests,
that is not to defend any form of an anti-paternalistic principle, it is
simply to differ, on a principled basis, as to whether or not homo-
sexuality is actually harmful.
Hart's emendation of Mill, then, which admits that some instances
of legal paternalism are justified, deprives the libertarian of any
principled basis for denying that all wrongful acts, other things being
equal, ought to be prevented, if necessary through the vehicle of the
criminal law. In any given case where the legal status of an act is in
dispute, it would seem that all the libertarian can do is to call the
legal moralist's attention to the value of human freedom, the costs
of enforcement, and, perhaps, the controversial nature of the claim
that the act in question is immoral or harmful at all. This seems to
be the conclusion reached by those who feel that they must follow
Hart in admitting that Mill's absolute stance against paternalism is
unsupportable.
I would like to suggest, though, that such a conclusion is far from
necessary.
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III
It has been the argument of this paper that both the legal moralist
and the libertarian must agiee that an individual or a community is
entitled to seek to prevent that which is sincerely believed to be im-
moral. The suggestion has therefore been that specific disputes be-
tween them can only be resolved by taking a stand on the moral merits.
This demands that the libertarian put forward some substantive con-
ception of what in principle determines the moral merits, and argue
in terms of it with respect to specific kinds of acts. But this is just what
writers such as Dworkin and Hart have conspicuously failed to do.
It is therefore no surprise that they fail to support satisfactorily the
libertarian position of the utilitarian J.S. Mill. In the remainder of
this paper, I shall seek to indicate what I take the implications of act
utilitarianism 24 to be with respect to the enforcement of morality.
Specifically, the paradigms which I have in mind are homosexuality,
prostitution, contraception, and pornography. With respect to all of
these, there are certain things which must be given special emphasis
by the utilitarian, not the least of which, we shall see, is an emended
version of Mill's absolute prohibition on legal paternalism.
In the first place, it is clear that the utilitarian holds a theory of
value quite different from that implicitly or explicitly assumed by
those who take a traditional religious perspective on such matters as
sexual morality and birth control. The utilitarian will view questions
of morality and immorality only in terms of ascertainable harms and
benefits as reflected in the desires and aversions, satisfactions and
dissatisfactions, pleasures and pains, of sentient creatures. Where many
find immorality and sin, the utilitarian will often find little, if any-
thing, to complain about. In some instances, such as birth control, he
will view as positively desirable what others may find morally objec-
tionable. To conceal such differences in substantive moral viewpoints
is only to court confusion.
Secondly, it is clear that the utilitarian must place a very high value
upon human freedom. It has instrumental value in that it permits
people to choose that which they desire, the satisfaction of such de-
sires being the sole intrinsic value for the utilitarian. And insofar as
most people prefer to be free to choose, not being interferred with
24. For a discussion of the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism closely
related to the theme of this paper, see Sartorius, Individual Conduct and Social Norins:
A Utilitarian Account, 82 ETHICS, No. 3 (1972).
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has intrinsic value as well. Now I do not mean to claim that the non-
utilitarian cannot place a high value upon human freedom; Devlin,
for instance, clearly has considerable regard for its importance. What
I do mean to point out is that the utilitarian is directly and clearly
committed to demanding a justification, in terms of harm to be pre-
vented or benefits to be won, for any interference with human free-
dom because on his theory there is the presumption that it is wrong.
In On Liberty, Mill emphasized the great instrumental value of in-
dividual liberty for society at large. Many libertarians obviously share
Mill's sentiments, but the question remains as to how the act utili-
tarian could without inconsistency propose an absolute prohibition
upon paternalistic legislation. In attacking Mill's principle in his
Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity in 1882, James Fitzjames Stephen
concluded that this question simply could not be answered. His quite
plausible suggestion is that no matter how great the value of freedom,
the utilitarian is committed by the very nature of his position to de-
ciding each case (of putatively justified paternalism) on its individual
merits.
If... the object aimed at is good, if the compulsion employed
such as to attain it, and if the good obtained overbalances the
inconvenience of the compulsion itself, I do not understand how,
upon utilitarian principles, the compulsion can be bad. I may add
that this way of stating the case shows that Mr. Mill's "simple
principle" is really a paradox. It can be justified only by showing
as a fact that, self-protection apart, no good object can be attained
by any compulsion which is not itself a greater evil than the ab-
sence of the object which the compulsion obtains.2
Contemporary writers such as Hart,2 6 believing that there are at least
some instances in which the law is justified in protecting individuals
against themselves, have not even attempted to answer Stephen's ob-
jections. They have followed him in rejecting Mill's principle, and
have thus deprived themselves of the one argument which they might
bring against the legal moralist which would transcend substantive
disputes concerning the morality or immorality of a given kind of act.
Now is Hart so obviously correct in suggesting that we have a more
realistic conception of human nature than did Mill,2 7 and that it is
25. Stephen. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, reprinted in part in LimmTs oF Lnmmr"
43, 51 (P. Radcliff ed. 1966).
26. See also Dworkin, Paternalism, in MOLALY AND THlE LAw 107.26 (R. Wamr.
strom ed. 1971).
27. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MoRAtrry, supra note 6, at 32-33.
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thus obvious to us that paternalistic legislation will sometimes be justi-
fied on utilitarian grounds, where Mill mistakenly believed that it
never was? Optimism with respect to human knowledge is admirable,
but it simply does not ring true to suggest that a mere century could,
in this context, make that much difference. If it is obvious to us that
paternalistic legislation is sometimes warranted on utilitarian grounds,
it must have been so to Mill as well.
I believe that it was, and that close attention to Mill's argument
for his famous principle will reveal that that argument is not only
consistent with, but retains at least some plausibility in spite of, the
frank admission that there are specific instances in which paternalistic
legislation is justified on utilitarian grounds. The point, in brief, is
that with respect to positive law Mill must be taken to be arguing on
something like the constitutional level. Just as one might argue in
favor of First Amendment freedoms while acknowledging that without
such constitutional barriers to legislation there are instances in which
legal interference with the press, say, would be clearly desirable, so one
may advocate a constitutional barrier to legal paternalism while at
the same time admitting that in its absence specific bits of paternalistic
legislation might be justified.
How might one so argue? Assume: (1) that most acts of kind K are,
on utilitarian grounds, wrong, although (2) some acts of kind K are,
on utilitarian grounds, right, but that (3) most attempts to identify
exceptions to the rule of thumb "Acts of kind K are wrong" are mis-
taken because there is no reliable criterion by means of which excep-
tions to the rule may be identified. Where these conditions are satis-
fied, the act utilitarian has good reason, other things being equal, for
acting so as to prevent anyone from ever performing an act of kind K.
One would be inclined to argue this way with respect to First
Amendment freedoms. (1) Most governmental attempts at legal inter-
ference with, e.g., freedom of the press, have had bad consequences
and are thus wrong on utilitarian grounds. (2) But one can of course
think of specific ingtances in which legal interference with a given
publication would have good consequences. (3) On the other hand,
were government to have the legal power to decide that something
was a genuine exception to the hands-off policy indicated by (1), more
often than not decisions to interfere would be mistaken, with bad con-
sequences in specific cases, and a "chilling effect" in general on the
press stemming from fears that the power would be abused. There-
fore, an absolute prohibition on legal interference with the press is
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the choice which will have the best consequences in the long run.
Although this may not be very elegant as a piece of constitutional
analysis, it should suffice to remind us of what is a familiar and totally
reasonable pattern of argument totally consistent with an act utili-
tarian position. That the act in question is one of choice of a general
constitutional rule makes it no less an act.
Although Mill has not to the best of my knowledge been explicitly
interpreted in this manner,'2 8 there is little doubt that he is to be taken
as arguing in favor of his principle in just this way. For the utilitarian,
what is right and wrong is directly linked to the experienced satisfac-
tions and dissatisfactions of those affected by any act, and the indi-
vidual is the best judge of what is in his own interest. Mill's argument
against paternalism is that even where it is motivated by good inten-
tions, it is more often than not misguided, with resultant harm rather
than benefit to the individuals concerned, and the further harm to
society at large which stems from its failure to profit by what might
have been in any case an instructive "experiment in living."
[T]he strongest of all the arguments against the interference of
the public with purely personal conduct is that, when it does
interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly and in the wrong
place. On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the
opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though
often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right, because on such
questions they are only required to judge of their own interests,
of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be
practiced, would affect themselves. But the opinion of a similar
majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-
regarding conduct is quite as likely to be wrong as iight, for in
these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people's opin-
ion of what is good or bad for other people .... 29
What Mill here identifies as "the strongest of all .. arguments" in
favor of his principle has been systematically ignored in recent discus-
sions. But it is a strong argument, and in fact appears to be the only
one to which the utilitarian could consistently appeal in an attempt
to give Mill's principle the absolute status that Mill quite rightly re-
quired for it. In addition, it would seem to be the only hind of argu-
ment which is not damaged by the claim that there are specific in-
28. But Devlin at least realizes that Mill's principle is to be understood at something
like the constitutional level. See his Mill on Liberty in Morals, in DL%7jN, supra note
4, at 102, 103.
29. MiLL, supra note 1, at 102.
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stances in which paternalistic legislation would be justified on utili-
tarian grounds.
I have suggested that Mill can be interpreted as arguing at the con-
stitutional level for the adoption of a legal barrier to paternalistic
legislation. So he might. But in the context of current controversy
concerning homosexuality, and so on, it is clear that the libertarian
must appeal to the principle rather as one of political morality, similar
in status, but obviously opposed to, Dworkin's principle that a man
is only entitled to attempt to impose his principled moral convictions
upon others.
It is interesting to note that Mill understood quite well the position
of the legal moralist whom in terms of his principle he was attempting
to counter. "Nine-tenths of all moralists and speculative writers," he
notes,
teach that things are right because they are right; because we feel
them to be so. They tell us to search in our own minds and hearts
for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. What
can the poor public do but apply these instructions and make
their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably
unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world?...3)
... Who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they
regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man?3'
"The only tenable ground of condemnation" of those who would
enforce their moral views on others, Mill concludes, "would be that
with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the
public has no business to interfere."3 2
I believe history bears Mill out in his claim that paternalistic legis-
lation will in any given instance likely be misguided, but this, as Mill
apparently failed to realize, is not sufficient justification for an abso-
lute barrier to paternalism. As explicitly noted above, it also is re-
quired that there be no reliable criterion in terms of which exceptions
to the general rule-which are admitted to exist-can be identified.
Many, I suspect, would claim that Mill's principle must be modified
in light of the fact that there are certain limited classes of exceptions
which can be reliably identified, and I am inclined to agree with them.
Mill himself admitted that children and the "uncivilized" were to
30. Id. at 103.
31. Id. at 105.
32. Id. at 104-05.
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be exempted from the application of his principle, and there is little
doubt that he would have been willing to add the senile and mentally
infirm as well. Why should we have these exceptions? Clearly they are
not ad hoc, but are rather all instances of kinds of persons whose
capacity to make choices which will lead to the satisfaction of their
actual needs and desires is limited or not fully developed. In such
instances, the utilitarian can justify interference in terms of either
the individual's existing needs and desires as the individual himself
perceives them, or else in terms of needs and desires which it can with
great plausibility be argued that the individual will eventually come
to recognize. Thus the familiar, but cogent, argument for compulsory
education. But if such is the principle upon which such exceptions
may be based, it would appear that it would license other forms of
interference as well. For there are instances where it is empirically
demonstrable that people will act against their own interests if not
coerced into acting othenvise, and this again in terms of the indi-
vidual's interests as he himself perceives them; thus statutes making
compulsory the wearing of protective helmets by motorcycle riders,
and others prohibiting swimming after dark at unguarded beaches. 3
Mill quite rightly sought to guard against the moral zealot who is
prone to claim that the individual may be a very bad judge of what
constitutes his own good, and may thus justifiably be "forced to be
free," as Rousseau expressed it and Plato implied. But although the
utilitarian is committed to equating value with utility as revealed in
an individual's choice behavior, the stable preferences revealed are
not identical with the choice behavior, and may consistently be argued
to be out of kilter with it in specific instances. Where identifiable
classes of individuals can be shown to be likely to manifest choice
behavior inconsistent with their preferences as these preferences can
be unproblematically attributed to them, the odds change in favor
of interfering with their personal liberty, if necessary, in order to
protect them against themselves. Mill's principle can and should be
modified accordingly.
Although the suggested emendation is in line with our perhaps
more enlightened views about the fallibility of human judgment, as
Hart suggests, it will not compromise the usefulness of Mill's prin-
ciple to the libertarian. For the striking fact about the views of the
legal moralist is that, in urging that homosexual acts, and so on, be
33. These examples are from Dworkin, supra note 26.
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prohibited, he must employ a concept of harm and immorality that
bears no significant relation whatsoever to the needs and desires of
those individuals whom he would seek to protect against themselves,
as those individuals quite consistently perceive their needs and desiresa'a
IV
I have identified three closely related features of a utilitarian de-
fense of libertarianism: (1) A conception of value closely tied to the
interests of individuals as they themselves perceive them; (2) an
especially strong conception of the value of individual freedom of
choice; (3) a principled objection to interferences with self-regarding
conduct. We have seen that (3), as does (2), rests largely upon
(1). And it has been admitted that the real basis of the controversy
between the utilitarian (who is also a libertarian) and the legal
moralist lies in their quite different conceptions of what is of value
and moral significance. Is there, then, any reason to believe that the
legal moralist would accept an emended version of Mill's principle,
the argument for which rests upon a conception of human well-being
which he clearly rejects?
The utilitarian relies upon his own conception of value in arguing
that the individual is usually the best judge of what is for his own
good, and Mill's argument would be cogent even within a society of
avowed utilitarians. Those who base their moral views on religious
authority of course believe that they know the moral truth, and are
thus not likely to be impressed by the claim that they may be mis-
taken in imposing their views of human goodness and well-being on
others. Were they members of a community of morally like minded
individuals, they would find Mill's principle unacceptable. But as a
member of a morally heterogeneous community, the legal moralist
might indeed agree that legal interference with self-regarding conduct
is more often than not misguided, and thus accept Mill's principle.
Especially in a pluralistic democratic society, where one day's majority
may be the next day's minority, the legal moralist may urge the adop-
tion of principles of tolerance simply as a matter of self-protection.
He may view it as a positive evil that he is not able to prevent others
from acting in certain ways that he believes immoral, but he will view
34. So Hart is right in claiming that Mill's principle may be amended so as to permit
paternalism without countenancing the enforcement of morality as such. HARtT, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY, supra note 6, at 33.
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as an even greater evil his being forced by others with different moral
views to act in ways which he views as immoral. Within a pluralistic
society such as our own, it is thus to be hoped that the libertarian has
available to him, in an emended version of Mill's principle, a prin-
ciple of tolerance which might actually be used to persuade others
with substantially different views on issues such as homosexuality
to abstain from legal interference. The reaction of church leaders to
Supreme Court school prayer decisions surely suggests that broad
principles of the kind in question can win shared agreement among
those who hold widely divergent views about the substantive merits
of their application in specific instances. 35
But the virtues of the non-utilitarian's acceptance of a Millian prin-
ciple of tolerance reveal its defects. The principle that error knows
no rights continues to lurk in the background; as suggested above,
it is only the utilitarian who is willing to accord error some rights in
terms of a principle of tolerance even when he finds himself among
those who are morally like minded. Insofar as the non-utilitarian's
acceptance of a principle of tolerance is a form of self-protection, he
has no reason to accept it in a morally homogeneous community.
Neither does he have any reason to extend the protections it affords
to those who are too weak to represent a real threat to him within a
pluralistic society. And in spite of the great extent to which the virtues
of tolerance are extolled in our society, many would claim that as a
matter of fact tolerance is extended only to those groups which are
strong enough to represent a genuine political or economic threat.30
In another vein, it might be argued that a pluralistic society re-
quires observance of principles of tolerance in order to avoid the
breakdown of law and order. The enforcement of legal prohibitions
which a substantial proportion of the community believe are lacking
in moral foundation may not only be very costly, but is likely to
weaken respect for the legal system among those who view themselves
as being repressed rather than benefited. But this argument is no
better than the last, and in fact has the same implications. For we
know all too well that the majority can usually succeed in enforcing
its views upon even a substantial minority, and where the minority in
question is insubstantial the significance of its level of respect for the
legal system in general is also often insubstantial.
35. See S. KRIsLov, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 205.-06 (1968).
36. See generally Wolff, Beyond Tolerance, in A CRmqUE OF PtuR ToLE.nNc (1965).
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Such defenses of tolerance in terms of political expediency carry
weight in a pluralistic society, and are surely relevant. But the danger
in them lies in the fact that if they are taken to be the only defenses,
tolerance may come to be viewed as increasingly dispensable as society
becomes increasingly homogeneous, each increase in legal moralism
itself playing a causal role in increasing the level of homogeneity over
time, this in turn justifying further repression. As Mill perceived, a
society would result which, lacking the experience of a variety of in-
structive experiments in living, would itself be the eventual loser. The
utilitarian argument for Mill's principle of tolerance is therefore any-
thing but superfluous, for it would appear to be the only argument
which finds a firmer foundation for that principle than political
expediency.
The legal moralist will, of course, be quick to point out that he
would not view himself as being treated with excessive tolerance
should the law be radically changed overnight so as to reflect the
utilitarian's view of what morality, tempered by Mill's principle of
tolerance, demands. As far as he would be concerned, a world in which
homosexuality, prostitution, pornography, and so on were legally
permitted would be a world changed much for the worse, and it surely
could not be said to be a world which showed much respect for or
toleration of his moral views. For his views demand that such activi-
ties be legally prohibited. All of this must be admitted. As has been
emphasized throughout, the root of the controversy between the legal
moralist and the utilitarian lies in their quite different conceptions
of what constitutes the right and the good. Since they both share the
view that wrong ought, other things being equal, to be prevented,
they cannot both be equally satisfied.
There is, though, a form of tolerance which the utilitarian will ex-
tend to the legal moralist, one which the legal moralist has seldom
been kind enough to extend to his opponents in return. This form
of tolerance has little to do with Mill's principle, but is simply an
extension of the general utilitarian concern with avoiding preventable
human suffering and dissatisfaction. For, again given the principle
that wrong ought to be avoided, the legal moralist will be quite under-
standably dissatisfied at knowing that what he believes to be immoral
acts are not being deterred by force of law; if he is a retributivist, lie
will be further disturbed by the fact that immorality is being per-
mitted to go unpunished. Such dissatisfactions will be given consid-
eration by the utilitarian, and although it is perhaps unlikely that
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they will ever lead him to change his position on any substantive issue
with respect to the enforcement of morality, they surely may lead
him to temper the manner in which he will present his case, and are
likely to influence the nature of the legislation which he will advo-
cate. This sort of tolerance is most significant as it operates outside
of the law, however, and may strongly influence the nature of inter-
personal relations among those who hold divergent moral views on
admittedly sensitive subjects.
Hart has taken such strong exception to the above claim that he is
worth quoting at length:
a right to be protected from the distress which is inseparable from
the bare knowledge that others are acting in ways you think
wrong, cannot be acknowledged by anyone who recognizes indi-
vidual liberty as a value. For the extension of the utilitarian
principle that coercion may be used to protect men from harm,
so as to include their protection from this form of distress, cannot
stop there. If distress incident to the belief that others are doing
wrong 'is harm, so also is the distress incident to the belief that
others are doing what you do not want them to do. To punish
people for causing this form of distress would be tantamount to
punishing them simply because others object to what they do; and
the only liberty that could coexist with this extension of the utili-
tarian principle is liberty to do those things to which no one
seriously objects. Recognition of individual liberty as a value in-
volves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the indi-
vidual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when
they learn what it is that he does-unless, of course, there are other
good grounds for forbidding it. No social order which accords to
individual liberty any value could also accord the right to be pro-
tected from distress thus occasioned. 37
This is surely one of the strongest, and most puzzling, statements that
can be found in Hart's voluminous and valuable writings. In giving
consideration to such distress, the utilitarian is surely not suggesting
that anyone has an absolute 7ight not to be subjected to it, but merely
that it is a relevant consideration which ought to be given due weight.
And it is hard to believe that there are any instances in which giving
it heed would lead to strong legal prohibitions that would not have
been otherwise justified on utilitarian grounds. For, as Mill attempted
to make quite clear, it is future generations whose interests often
37- HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MfORALITY, supra note 6, at 4647.
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ought to guide legislation, and with a view to mores changing as a
result of legislation, the distress of those who would be displeased
or even anguished by legislative repeal of specific legal prohibitions
is not likely to count for much. Consider, for instance, homosexuality.
Some would, of course, be distressed if the law were to become more
permissive with respect to it. But it is not likely that future genera.
tions will hold such views, and even if they do, what about the distress
caused to homosexuals who find themselves heavily penalized for their
peculiar way of expressing what are among the most basic of human
desires? Certainly any reasonable balancing of satisfactions and dis-
satisfactions would at best justify little more than protecting the legal
moralist (and others) from homosexuals flaunting their idiosyncra-
sies upon the public in the same manner and to the same degree to
which heterosexuality is promoted through such means as advertising.
Respect for the distress that may be caused to those who hold deep
moral convictions that one is in disagreement with can be a rationali-
zation for opposing change, but seldom a good reason. It can, though,
and should be, a reason for dealing with those with whom one differs
in certain ways. Any moral view which ignored this under the banner
of the slogan that "error has no rights" would surely be objectionable.
Utilitarianism, fortunately, seems to me to give the proper moral
perspective on this score. Indeed, it has been the argument of this
article that it provides an adequate ground for dealing with the issue
of the enforcement of morality, and thus all aspects of the general
theme that error has some rights but not others.
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